# 5G Security:

# Risks, Mitigation and Challenges

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**Innovationstreiber 5G: Technologie – Risiken – Anwendungsmöglichkeiten**

**09.11.2021 - Technopark Winterthur**

(*Joint work of INSPIRE-5Gplus team)

INSPIRE-5Gplus

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# INtelligent Security and PervasIve tRust for 5G and BEyond : INSPIRE-5Gplus

INSPIRE-5Gplus

- Make a revolutionary shift in the 5G (and Beyond) Security vision
  - ***Progress 5G Security*** and **devise a smart, trustworthy and liability-aware 5G security platform for future connected systems**, while contributing to its realization.
- Allow the advancement of security vision for 5G and Beyond through the adoption of
  - a set of emerging trends and technologies, such as **zero-touch management (ZSM), SD-SEC models, AI/ML techniques and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)**
  - **new breed of SD-SEC assets and models** that will be developed to address some of the incumbent (e.g., adaptive slice security) or completely new (e.g., proactive security) challenges.

**Duration:** 3Y, start: 1 Nov 2019

**Programme:** H2020 RIA

**Project website:** http://inspire-5gplus.eu

# About Me (Highlights)

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School of Engineering

## Education

- **Bogazici University**, Istanbul, TURKEY.
  Ph.D. in Computer Eng., 2013.

- In addition to academia, more than 10 years of experience in technology companies (on-off mode)
-Involved in various ITEA, CELTIC, Innosuisse, and TÜBiTAK (TR) research projects as senior researcher, project coordinator and academic consultant
- Two patents (1 US, 1 TR)
- IEEE Senior member

**Current research interests:** Future Internet, information security, 5G/B5G networks and ICN

## Current position

– Senior Lecturer @ ZHAW in Switzerland

More information: www.zhaw.ch/en/about-us/person/gueu/

# Outline

– **Key message**: 5G Networks: a Swiss Knife for connected services leading to **F**lexibility, **C**omplexity and **H**eterogenity conditions

{Threats + Risks}× 5G Characteristics → Security Challenges

– Outline:

- 5G itself
- 5G characteristics and security
- Threats and solution arsenal
- Challenges and some ideas




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# Networks are the lifeline of our civilization ...

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- More and more reliance on networked infrastructure
  → Internet of Everything
- Mission critical services
- Massive and continuing traffic growth, esp. in mobile data traffic, high increase in wireless devices, networks, services and users




Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2016–2021, 2017.
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-520862.pdf

- More to come with IoT, MTC, 5G and Beyond
- Not solely networks anymore : Cloud resident and fog services, e.g. connected cars
- **COVID-19 pandemic!**

**Network is a critical infrastructure itself ...**

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# 5G network architecture and security




**Source:** European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)

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# 5G network architecture (Another perspective)

- Example : operator offer enriched by partner[1]




**Multi-party & multi-layer 5G infrastructure for service delivery**

[1]NGMN Alliance, "5G White Paper," Next generation mobile networks, white paper, vol. 1, 2015.
[2]C. Gaber *et al*., "Liability-Aware Security Management for 5G," *2020 IEEE 3rd 5G World Forum (5GWF)*, 2020, pp. 133-138, doi: 10.1109/5GWF49715.2020.9221407.

# 5G characteristics - I

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- Scale
  - Billions of devices (IoT)
  - Very high bitrates, ultra-low latency, QoS guarantees
  - Different modes of connectivity
  - Visibility and governance
  - Omnipresence
    - Novel services
    - Physical presence
- Softwarization
  - Software-defined networking
  - Virtualization
  - Cloudification
  - Network slicing
  - Software-oriented operation




5G

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# 5G characteristics - II

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- Complexity
  - Open systems (no vendor lock-in)
  - Different actors: service providers, OTT..
    - Fragmentation
  - Verticals (slicing)
    - Critical services relying on the infrastructure (service-based paradigm
  - Management for SLAs
  - Convergence
  - Mobile applications and devices



- Flexibility
  - APIs
  - Fast service deployment
  - Automation and closed-loop control (not a silver bullet!)
  - AI/ML driven optimizations and automation
  - Integration of «3rd-party» technologies

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# An example 5G network instantiation with verticals ...

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


**5G-Transformer users**
Mobile (Virtual) Network Operators
Vertical Industries

**Vertical Slicer (VS)**
Logical entry point for verticals to support the creation and management of their transport slices in a short time-scale

**Service Orchestrator (SO)**
Federation of transport networking and computing resources from multiple domains and allocation to slices

**Mobile Transport and Computing Platform for Verticals (MTP)**
Underlying unified transport stratum for integrated fronthaul and backhaul networks

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**Source:** 5G-Transformer: 5G Mobile Transport Platform for Verticals Project

# What is «cyber»security? A quick reminder ...

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| | |
|---|---|
| Cybersecurity – | The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks. |
| Cyberspace – | A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. |
| Cyber Attack – | An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise's use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled information. |

NIST Interagency Report (IR) 7298 Revision 2 **"Glossary of Key Information Security Terms"**, 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf




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# Current 5G security solutions

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| Segment | Rationale | Specific SotA elements |
|---|---|---|
| **Infrastructure/Platform Level** | Focus on core 5G technologies for 5G networks (e.g., SDN or NFV security) | RAN, network softwarisation, MEC domain, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as an enabler in the infrastructure |
| **Management/Automation Level** | Soft techniques and enablers, more generally applicable impacting general ICT security (e.g., AI/ML security) | Zero touch Service Management (ZSM), DLT, trust and liability, cyber threat intelligence, security via AI/ML and security for AI/ML |
| **Service/Vertical Level** | Service and end user perspectives, verticals, use-case driven security solutions | Verticals, services, IoT as a key service domain |

**Source:** INSPIRE-5Gplus project, Deliverable D2.1 5G Security: Current Status and Future Trends https://zenodo.org/record/4569519

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# But who watches the watchmen?

- **Securing AI/ML : An emerging topic for 5G and Beyond 5G[3] systems security ...**
  - **Adversarial Machine Learning:** Bad guys distorting your learning
  - **Adversarial** environment, **mimicry** attacks
  - E.g., some adversaries may be capable to design training data that will mislead the learning algorithm.




[3]P. Porambage, G. Gür, D. P. M. Osorio, M. Liyanage, A. Gurtov and M. Ylianttila, "The Roadmap to 6G Security and Privacy," in *IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society*, vol. 2, pp. 1094-1122, 2021, doi: 10.1109/OJCOMS.2021.3078081.

# Expectations of the industry ...

- More secure
- Cheaper
- Better
- Easier to manage

...

| Security Requirement No. | Requirement |
|---|---|
| SEC-REQ-01 | The 5G network shall provide telemetry and other auditing information relevant to the security mechanisms of the system. |
| SEC-REQ-02 | The 5G network shall only allow authenticated users to consume the services provided by the 5G system. |
| SEC-REQ-03 | The 5G network shall warrant measurable level of availability of its services to the relevant stakeholders. |
| SEC-REQ-04 | The 5G network shall ensure the necessary network capacity and network resources necessary for the critical operations of the 5G services. |
| SEC-REQ-05 | The 5G network shall enable a platform for vertical services to be deployed. |
| SEC-REQ-06 | The 5G network shall enable the state management of its platform components. |
| SEC-REQ-07 | The 5G network shall be able to revert to previous states with minimal service disruption of deployed application in case of malicious compromise. |
| SEC-REQ-8 | The 5G network's security mechanisms should not impact the functional requirements of critical operations for vertical applications. |
| SEC-REQ-9 | The security mechanisms of the 5G network shall be able to be deployed in any potential 5G hardware provider without any impact on their performance or functionality. |
| SEC-REQ-10 | The security mechanisms of the 5G network shall be able to measure/evaluate trust level of its components and platforms and |

**Source:** INSPIRE-5Gplus project, Deliverable D2.1 5G Security: Current Status and Future Trends https://zenodo.org/record/4569519

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# Open issues (Product ideas?) - I

Tools for ...

- Device management (identity management, authenticaiton, authorization)
- SLA management and monitoring
  - E.g., slice isolation
  - Automated incentives and penalties
  - Difficulties to manage vertical SLA and regulation compliance
- HW based security (TEE (Trusted Execution Environment), Trusted Computing (TC) concepts)
- Remote attestation (of VMs and containers)

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# Open issues (Product ideas?) - II

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Tools for ...

- Liability contractualization and monitoring
  - Interdisciplinary nature (e.g., business and legal aspects)
  - Accountability → Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
- Certification tools and compliance verifiers
  - Regulations (dynamic and painful for service providers and operators)
- Active security and threat analysis of complex systems (inc. MEC and IoT)
- Physical protection of infrastructure
- Lightweight network and service monitoring
  - Scalability challenges
  - EU Green Deal

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# Open issues (Product ideas?) - III

Tools for ...

- AI weaponization for good
  - ETSI ZSM paradigm for security management
  - AI based software testing
- SW security tools (e.g., against implementation issues)
  - E.g., automated and active testing/scanning of the infrastructure
- Better mathematical tools for analysis and verification
  - Publicly-verifiable proofs of compliance
- AI «securers»
  - Adversarial AI
  - Explainability

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# Thank you for your attention!


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